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Luban: The Conscience of a Prosecutor

Lecture
THE CONSCIENCE OF A PROSECUTOR
David Luban

Dedicated to the memory of Fred Zacharias
In this lecture, I want to ask some very large and fundamental
questions about the role of conscience and a lawyer‘s own moral
convictions, and what to do if they conflict with the lawyer‘s
professional obligations. I also want to ask what those professional
obligations are for prosecutors in an adversary system of criminal justice.
Finally, I shall raise questions about whether a lawyer working in an
organization ought to defer her judgment to higher-ups in the
organization.
But I am going to focus these large inquiries through a very concrete
question: should a prosecutor throw a case to avoid keeping men he
thinks are innocent in prison?
Two years ago, a startling story appeared in the New York Times: a
veteran prosecutor in New York City‘s District Attorney‘s (―D.A.‘s‖)
office, Daniel Bibb, was assigned to reexamine two men‘s murder
convictions because of new evidence. 1 The men had been in prison for
more than a decade, and the new evidence showed that they might be
victims of a horrible case of mistaken identity, as defense lawyers and a
tenacious police detective had maintained for years. After an exhaustive
twenty-one-month investigation, Bibb became convinced they were not


University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University
Law Center. This article is an expanded version of the Tabor Lecture that I delivered at
Valparaiso School of Law in April 2010. My title is modeled after David Mellinkoff‘s 1973
classic The Conscience of a Lawyer, which I gratefully acknowledge. I am also grateful to Dan
Bibb for extensive discussion of the case described here, as well as comments and
corrections he offered to an earlier draft. After I had posted an earlier version of this article
on SSRN and Berkeley Electronic Press, one of the defense lawyers, Steve Cohen, contacted
me and gave me his perspective on the case, which I have incorporated into the present
version. I am very grateful to him for taking the time to write and talk with me. Thanks as
well to Professors Bob Condlin, Bruce Green, Deborah Rhode, Brad Wendel, and Melanie
Wilson for comments on the earlier version. In the summer of 2010, I presented a version
of this paper to the Aksaray (Turkey) Bar Association as part of a legal ethics conference
organized by the bar associations of Ankara and Aksaray as well as the University of
Ankara. I wish to thank Professors Ioanna Kuçuradi and Gülriz Uygur for discussions of
the case, as well as Professor Tomo Morigiwa for his helpful comments.
1
Benjamin Weiser, Doubting Case, a Prosecutor Helped the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/nyregion/23da.html?_r=1&pagewanted=al
[hereinafter Weiser, Doubting Case].
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guilty. But he could not persuade his superiors to drop the cases, so he
went in to the hearing and, in his words, he threw the case. ―I did the
best I could,‖ Bibb said, ―To lose.‖2
As he explained to the reporter, Bibb helped defense lawyers connect
the different pieces of evidence. He persuaded exculpatory witnesses to
testify, told them in advance what his cross-examination questions
would be, and held his fire in cross. All the while, he continued to ask
his superiors to drop the cases. They agreed to do so for one man, and
the judge ordered a new trial for the other. 3 At that point, Bibb said,
―I‘m done . . . . I wanted nothing to do with it.‖ 4 Bibb eventually
resigned—although he had been happy with his career as a prosecutor.
After this startling story appeared in the Times, New York
disciplinary authorities filed a complaint against Bibb; eventually he was
cleared of disciplinary charges.5 Currently, Bibb is in private practice.
As for the two men that Bibb thought were wrongly convicted:
Olmedo Hidalgo, against whom the D.A.‘s office dropped the charges,
was deported to the Dominican Republic.6 David Lemus, who the D.A.‘s
office re-tried over Bibb‘s objection, was acquitted by a jury and released
after spending fourteen years in prison.7 Subsequently, he sued New
York City for wrongful imprisonment, and the city settled for $1.2
million.8 Hidalgo also sued, and reportedly settled for more than twice
that amount.9 Their lawsuits were based on powerful proof that the
police detective investigating the crime had from the very beginning
ignored evidence that another man, Thomas ―Spanky‖ Morales, was the
real shooter. When new evidence of mistaken identity surfaced later, the
D.A.‘s office compounded the error by dragging its feet and defending
Id.
People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3611, at *1 n.1, *83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Oct. 25, 2005).
4
Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1.
5
Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Who Threw a City Case Is Vindicated, Not Punished, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2009, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/nyregion/
05da.html [hereinafter Weiser, Threw a City Case].
6
Anemona Hartocollis, Witness Confesses in 1990 Killing, but Prosecutors Keep Pursuing
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/nyregion/
03palladium.html?pagewanted=print [hereinafter Hartocollis, Witness Confesses].
7
Anemona Hartocollis, Man Convicted in Club Death Is Acquitted at Second Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/nyregion/07palladium.html
[hereinafter Hartocollis, Man Convicted].
8
Man Awarded $1.2 Million After Spending 14 Years Behind Bars for Wrongful Conviction,
BOSSIP, Dec. 30, 2009, http://bossip.com/197716/man-awarded-1-2-million-afterspending-14-years-behind-bars-for-wrongful-conviction/.
9
Benjamin Weiser, Settlement for Man Wrongly Convicted in Palladium Killing, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/nyregion/
31palladium.html [hereinafter Weiser, Settlement].
2
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the convictions.10 From the defense point of view, Bibb‘s assignment to
reinvestigate the case came far too late, and his moral dilemma arose
because he was instructed to defend convictions in the face of
overwhelming evidence of innocence that defense lawyers had
developed over many years. In the opinion of defense lawyer Steven
Cohen, ―Frankly, there was no[t] a prosecutor in the DA‘s Office who
could have preserved those convictions.‖11 Cohen rejects the view that
Bibb threw the case, because ―by the time we got to a hearing the result
was all but pre-ordained.‖12
Bibb disputes Cohen‘s view that his investigation was unnecessary;
he points to several key witnesses whose evidence he developed.13 In
any case, even if the result of the hearing was a foregone conclusion, that
would not make Bibb‘s dilemma less real. He was still ordered to defend
convictions of men that he was sure were innocent; in that situation, no
one can afford to think that their own actions are irrelevant. But that is
getting ahead of the story.
I. THE PALLADIUM MURDER
Before turning to issues of ethics and theory, it will be useful to
understand the facts of the case. It began in 1990 at an East Village
nightclub called the Palladium on Thanksgiving night. A bouncer
punched a man in the face and expelled him from the club. The man
decided to take revenge and returned with friends and guns. In the wee
hours of the morning, two of the gunmen opened fire on bouncers
standing outside the club, killing 23-year-old Mark Petersen and
wounding a second bouncer.14
How did police come to arrest Lemus and Hidalgo for the Palladium
murder? The two men claimed they did not even know each other;
Hidalgo said he had never been to the Palladium, and Lemus said he

See People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, at *12–15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Sept. 22, 2006) (laying out the history of the investigative and prosecutorial efforts). Judge
Bonnie Wittner‘s opinion certainly was that the investigative and prosecutorial efforts were
botched. Id.
11
E-mail from Steven M. Cohen to author (June 2, 2010, 07:49 PM) (on file with author).
12
Id.
13
See E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Aug. 11, 2010, 05:18 PM) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Bibb E-mail, 5:18] (mentioning witnesses Eddie Troche, Mike Colomer, Darrell
Gray, and Danila ―Sanchez‖ Troche); E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Aug. 11, 2010,
01:57 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bibb E-mail, 1:57] (mentioning Troche,
Colomer, and Gray).
14
Stone Phillips & Dan Slepian, Murder at the Palladium: Were Two Men Wrongly
Convicted in New York Nightclub Case?, DATELINE NBC (Sept. 8, 2008, 9:06:58 PM ET),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6913736/ns/dateline_nbc-crime_reports//.
10
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had been there only once in his life, a year before the shooting. But both
had prior arrests that got their photos into police files and led to
eyewitnesses picking them out of photo arrays that detectives showed
them. At trial, multiple eyewitnesses were able to identify Lemus and
Hidalgo.15
There was one other damning piece of evidence against Lemus: he
bragged to a woman named Delores Spencer that he had committed the
Palladium killing. She told a friend who told the police. Police had
Spencer tape subsequent phone calls with Lemus.16 This is what the jury
at the 1992 trial heard on the tape:
David Lemus: ―If you‘re scared, just say you‘re scared.‖
Delores Spencer: ―Why should I be scared of you?‖
Lemus: ―Because you know that I know that you
know.‖ [3 short puffs]17
Lemus and Hidalgo‘s attorney did not put on any witnesses, and after a
day‘s deliberation, the jury convicted the men of second-degree murder.
They each drew sentences of 25 years to life.18
That might have been the end of the story except for a series of
coincidences. Around the time the jury convicted Lemus and Hidalgo,
New York City detective Robert Addolorato was investigating a Bronx
drug and extortion gang called C&C.19 One of his informants told him
that two C&C members named Joey Pillot and Thomas ―Spanky‖
Morales—not Lemus or Hidalgo—were the real Palladium shooters.20
Addolorato reported what he heard to the Manhattan D.A.‘s office
but was told that it did not match the known facts.21 Understanding
Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, at *8–10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept.
22, 2006).
20
Id.
21
Herein lies a story. At the time of the murder, an anonymous caller told Manhattan
police that ―Joey‖ and ―Spanky‖ were the shooters. Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, In the Face
of Evidence—A Special Report; Another Confessed in Killing, But 2 Men Remain in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/25/nyregion/
face-evidence-special-report-another-confessed-killing-but-2-men-remain-prison.html.
Victoria Garcia, the investigating detective matched the nickname ―Spanky‖ to a man
named Franky Figueroa, but excluded him as a suspect when she discovered that he was
incarcerated the night of the shooting. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812 at *3–4. Lemus
seemed like a far more obvious suspect, because of his boast to Delores Spencer that he had
done the shooting. Detective Garcia followed up on Lemus, and ―Spanky‖ dropped
through the cracks.
15
16
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quite well that snitches sometimes lie, Detective Addolorato let it drop
until 1996, four years later. By that time he was working with federal
prosecutors in the C&C investigation, and they arrested none other than
Joey Pillot and Spanky Morales. Pillot agreed to cooperate, and his
lawyer worked out what prosecutors call a ―queen for a day‖ agreement:
Pillot would sing, and none of what he said could be used to prosecute
him.22
Pillot told the investigators that he and Morales were indeed the real
Palladium shooters. Furthermore, he provided details that matched the
facts: he remembered that his own gun had jammed and that he ejected
a cartridge—and police in fact found an ejected cartridge on the scene. 23
Additionally, Morales drove a blue Oldsmobile, with a license number
containing an 8 and a 1. Eyewitnesses had told police that the shooters
escaped in a blue car whose license number included an 8 and a 1.24
Addolorato went back to the D.A.‘s office, and, after some initial
resistance, the D.A. agreed to a new hearing on the Palladium shooting:
a so-called ―440 hearing,‖ referring to section 440.10(g) of the New York
Code, which provides for motions to vacate a judgment when new
evidence is discovered. But the D.A. argued that the new information,
which might well incriminate Spanky Morales, did not show that Lemus
or Hidalgo were innocent—and the judge agreed.25 Even back at the
original trial, prosecutors had raised the possibility of a third
perpetrator.26 Justice Gold found Pillot‘s claim that he and Morales were
the sole perpetrators ―entirely unworthy of belief.‖27
Then, in 2000, an inmate named Richie Feliciano read a news story
about the Palladium case.28 In early 2001, he told federal prosecutors
that he had been at the Palladium that night, just a few feet away when
Spanky Morales shot the bouncers. Feliciano had been the ―mediator‖
attempting to defuse the conflict between Morales and the bouncers—or
perhaps the decoy distracting the bouncers.29 In fact, Feliciano said he
was the one who drove Morales‘s car away from the scene. It seemed

Hartocollis, Witness Confesses, supra note 6.
Id.
24
Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812 at *9.
25
Id. at *10–12.
26
Hartocollis, Witness Confesses, supra note 6, Dec. 7, 2007 correction.
27
People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3611, at *20 (Oct. 25, 2005).
28
Interview with Steven Cohen (July 24, 2010). Cohen indicated that Feliciano read the
New York Times article by Fritsch and Rohde cited supra at note 21. Id.
29
Cohen Interview, supra note 28. The description of Feliciano as a mediator is Cohen‘s.
Bibb believes that Feliciano‘s role in the Palladium shooting was to distract the bouncers.
E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Apr. 27, 2010, 4:05 PM) (on file with author).
22
23
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increasingly likely that the case against Hidalgo and Lemus was a
gigantic miscarriage of justice.
The two convicted men were represented pro bono by a lawyer
named Steve Cohen. Cohen is a former federal prosecutor, and back in
1996 he was present during Joey Pillot‘s queen-for-a-day revelation that
he and Spanky Morales had committed the Palladium murder. As
Cohen explains it, his initial interest as a prosecutor
was not that two innocent men were in jail, but that we
wanted to use Joey as a witness in the C&C prosecution.
I was concerned that we would need a state plea
agreement as well as a federal agreement, because we
couldn‘t fold the Palladium murder into a RICO
charge.30
But the Manhattan D.A.‘s office rebuffed Cohen when he and
Addolorato alerted them about Pillot‘s confession. When Cohen went
into private practice as a litigator at the New York law firm Kronish Lieb
Weiner & Hellman (now Cooley Godward Kronish), the case continued
to weigh on his mind. ―This is the only case I left behind that keeps me
up at night, that plays on my conscience,‖ Cohen told a reporter in
2000.31 After Lemus‘s mother began calling him, Cohen agreed to
represent Lemus and Hidalgo pro bono. 32 Addolorato, the police
detective who first heard Joey Pillot‘s information, also stuck with the
case for sixteen years, and he was in the courtroom when Lemus was
ultimately acquitted.33 In Cohen‘s view, Addolorato was the true hero in
the Palladium case.34
Word of Feliciano‘s admission soon got to Cohen and to Lemus‘s
trial lawyer, Eric Sears; as Cohen observes, the New York City criminal
bar is a small world.35 In 2003, they went back to the Manhattan D.A.‘s
office and spoke with ADA Stephen Saracco, the head of the Cold Case
Unit who had argued the state‘s side at the 440 hearing. Cohen urged
Saracco that it was time for a new trial. Saracco asked, ―Are you saying
that these guys are actually innocent, or that they have a right to a new
trial?‖ Cohen replied that they were actually innocent. 36 Saracco agreed
to open a new investigation, which he thought would take six weeks and
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
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Hartocollis, Man Convicted, supra note 7.
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lead to a new 440 hearing.37 But Saracco retired, and the D.A.‘s office
assigned the investigation to Daniel Bibb. Bibb left a message on
Cohen‘s voicemail:
Steve this is Dan Bibb from the Manhattan D.A.‘s office.
What I can tell you is that the investigation is
proceeding. There are interviews happening every day
of people with information relevant to the investigation.
I can also tell you that the investigation is not going to
take weeks, it‘s going to take months.
If that‘s
38
unfortunate for you, I apologize.
In fact, Bibb‘s investigation took not months, but years. Bibb describes
the investigation as follows: ―Two detectives from the Manhattan South
Homicide Squad and I ultimately interviewed over 60 people in
connection with the investigation. Interviews were conducted in at least
fifteen states, three New York State prisons, eight federal prisons and
one county jail, all of which were spread across the country.‖39 By the
end of the investigation, Bibb was convinced that Lemus and Hidalgo
had nothing to do with the Palladium shooting.
Then why had Lemus told Delores Spencer that he was involved?
According to Lemus, it was simply a pathetic story of talking big to
impress a woman. He was twenty-two years old at the time, and
Spencer was thirty—a married mother of three children who, in Lemus‘s
words, ―liked the gangster type and thugs.‖ 40 Lemus wanted to show
Spencer that he was a tough guy and a player, not just a ―knucklehead
with a bus pass.‖41 He had seen the news about the Palladium shooting
on television, and it was the first thing that came to his mind. Here is an
exchange between Lemus and NBC Dateline producer Dan Slepian,
whose special on the Palladium case gave it a national profile:
Lemus: ―I told her that I was at the Palladium, and there
was a shootout that happened at the Palladium, and
some people had got shot, and I told her that I was a
part of that.‖

Affirmation of Eric M. Sears at ¶13, People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3611 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cooley.com/files/
tbl_s5SiteRepository/FileUpload21/837/14_eric_affirmation.pdf.
38
Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14.
39
Letter from Daniel Bibb to Alan Friedberg, Departmental Disciplinary Comm., N.Y.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2 (Nov. 7, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bibb Letter].
40
Fritsch & Rohde, supra note 21.
41
Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14.
37

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 1

8

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Slepian: ―Why say that?‖
Lemus: ―I was trying to portray this image of somebody
that I wasn‘t.‖
....
Lemus: ―There‘s not a day that goes by that I don‘t say
to myself, out of all the things you could have said to
Delores that day, why the Palladium? Eats you up.‖42
Meanwhile, we can only guess what conversations were going on
between Bibb and his superiors in the Manhattan D.A.‘s office, but they
must have been tense and difficult. Bibb, quite properly, will not talk
about confidential office conversations.
The D.A.‘s office did not dispute that Morales was the shooter.
Rather, along the lines of the third-perpetrator theory, they told Bibb to
defend the convictions and argue that all the men were in cahoots. Bibb,
on the other hand, was convinced that Lemus and Hidalgo had nothing
to do with Morales and Pillot.
Why not prosecute Spanky Morales? This was a question the judge
asked Bibb, and his answers hint at some of the disagreements that must
have been going on in the D.A.‘s office:
Judge Roger Hayes: ―It is something that is puzzling to
the court.‖
Bibb: ―It is the subject of continuing discussion within
my office.‖
Judge Hayes: ―In other words, if your theory is correct,
why is that person unprosecuted?‖
Bibb: ―That also has been the subject of continuing
discussions in my office.‖43
Bibb explains that cases in which prosecutors delay indictment are
extremely vulnerable to speedy trial and due process motions, and by
this time the D.A.‘s office had collected significant evidence against
Morales in the Palladium case for many years. 44

Id.
Id.
44
Cf. People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1978). In Singer, the court stated that:
An untimely prosecution may be subject to dismissal even though, in
the interim, the defendant was not formally accused, restrained or
incarcerated for the offense. Thus the State due process requirement of
a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by statute and the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
42
43
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Bibb says that he personally had no problem charging Morales, and
in fact he was pushing for the indictment.45 As he puts it: ―I always
thought that in a homicide it‘s better to prosecute and lose on a motion
than not to prosecute at all. No dead body should go unpunished.‖ 46
Presumably others in the office disagreed because they concluded that
the indictment would be dismissed.
Finally—a few weeks before the new 440 hearing—police arrested
Morales for his role in the Palladium homicide, and Bibb drew the
assignment to prosecute him.47 As the D.A.‘s office foresaw, when
Spanky Morales was finally indicted the judge dismissed the case on a
so-called Singer speedy trial motion.48 Because of double jeopardy,
Morales was safe and could testify in David Lemus‘s retrial. Defense
attorney Cohen believes that the reason the office finally indicted
Morales is obvious: his apparent guilt was going to come out in a matter
of months at Lemus‘s and Hidalgo‘s 440 hearing, and it would look
awful if prosecutors had allowed Morales to go unindicted.49
The Palladium case was already an embarrassment to the D.A.‘s
office as news stories over the years, including Dan Slepian‘s NBC
Dateline special, had painted the convictions as a spectacular miscarriage
of justice.50 It was embarrassing enough to become an issue in the reelection campaign of District Attorney Robert Morgenthau. Palladium
was an embarrassment as well because of items that turned up in the
case file. First, as mentioned earlier, back in 1990 an anonymous tipster
phoned a hotline to say that Spanky Morales was the shooter. 51 No one
ever pursued that lead, but the note was in the file. Second, soon after
the shooting, Morales‘s sister-in-law told police that Spanky was
involved.52 Third, three of the state‘s own eyewitnesses had identified
Morales from a photo array.53 However, Police Detective Victoria Garcia

Bibb E-mail, 5:18, supra note 13.
Telephone Interview with Daniel Bibb (Apr. 14, 2010).
47
Bibb E-mail, supra note 29.
48
People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, *27 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 22,
2006).
49
Cohen Interview, supra note 28.
50
See Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14 (―Fourteen years after the Palladium murder, it‘s
up to the judge to decide did these men get a fair shake from the system. Should they be
set free? Those are questions that weigh heavily on all those who have been drawn into the
case.‖)
51
See supra note 21.
52
See Bibb Interview, supra note 46 (explaining that Morales‘s sister-in-law went to the
police out of anger because, while her husband was in the military in Iraq, Spanky—her
husband‘s brother—raped her).
53
People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 3611, *39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Oct. 25, 2005).
45
46
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explained that she did not write a report about the photo array or a
wanted card for Morales because it would weaken the state‘s case
against Lemus and Hidalgo.54 It seemed that the police had bungled the
investigation and then ignored evidence in its own files.
All this led Lemus‘s and Hidalgo‘s attorneys to argue that the state
had committed Brady violations by not revealing the evidence showing
that Morales was the guilty man. Here, however, Bibb was not inclined
to play along with the defense. In his own words, he ―fought the Brady
allegations tooth and nail,‖ cross-examining Lemus‘s attorney, Eric
Sears, for two full days.55 Bibb argued that prosecutors told the defense
lawyers about Morales in a timely fashion, and the defense withdrew
that portion of their Brady claim.56 Thus, whatever ways Bibb ―threw the
case,‖ admitting police misconduct was not one of them.
Bibb was clearly less comfortable advancing the state‘s theory that
Morales, Lemus, and Hidalgo were all involved. That is not surprising
because, as we now know, Bibb was convinced that they were not. ―I
came to believe that Hidalgo wasn‘t there. And if he wasn‘t there, he
certainly couldn‘t have done it.‖ 57 At one point, the judge asked Bibb,
―Is there any information in your possession that ties the defendant with
each other or the C and C gang[?]‖ and Bibb responded ―Only in the
most tenuous way.‖58 The men had all grown up in the same
neighborhood and hung out at the same bars, but there was no evidence
that Lemus and Hidalgo had anything to do with the gang. ―Absent
that,‖ Bibb stated, ―I‘ve been able to find no other connections.‖ 59 Bibb
elaborates:
Many of the witnesses that Lemus and Hidalgo called at
the hearing were cooperating with me in the prosecution
of Morales. They included at least a half dozen
witnesses who Morales admitted his participation to. As
I explained when we spoke, the admissions Morales
made to these witnesses . . . placed him in the role that
54

Id. at *34–35. Garcia testified:
It‘s not in the best interest of the NYPD to put a wanted card on a
possible perp[etrator]. . . . I know from experience that once you do
that, if he was the right guy, and I agree that that is what the case is
here, you would have lost the case, right there, it would have been
over.

Id.
55
56
57
58
59
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Lemus was identified by the eyewitnesses as playing,
that of the person hit by the bouncer and thrown out of
the club. You definitely cannot have two people playing
the exact same role in a crime. This is one of the reasons
I was and remain convinced that Lemus was
misidentified and Morales actually played that role.
For the sake of completeness, I am convinced that
the four people involved in the crime were Thomas
Morales aka Spanky (hit by [the] bouncer and thrown
out of the club, gunman and active shooter), Joseph
Pillot aka Joey (gunman whose gun misfired), Ramon
Callejas aka Peachy (third gunman who did not fire his
weapon and who looks a lot like Morales) and Richard
Feliciano aka Richie (employed as a distraction so
Spanky could try to get back into the club to kill the
bouncer who actually hit him and threw him out of the
club). Lemus may very well have been there but, if he
was, he was not involved. Hidalgo was not there and
was most likely having Thanksgiving dinner with a
friend and his friend‘s wife.60
These are the tangled events that led Bibb to throw the case.
Contrary to news reports, he never ―coached‖ or ―strategized‖ with
defense attorneys—by this time, Lemus and Hidalgo were represented
not only by Steve Cohen‘s firm Cooley Godward Kronish but also by pro
bono attorneys from Dickstein Shapiro—but he did speak with them
about ―the evidence I had uncovered and my view as to what the
evidence meant . . . . On a number of occasions, when they did not
understand the import of a particular piece of evidence, I explained it to
them.‖61 Gordon Mehler, one of Lemus‘s lawyers, confirmed Bibb‘s
account when he told a reporter that ―If I make a mistake in my
interpretation of what he said, he‘ll correct me . . . . If there‘s a piece of
evidence that [bore] on another piece of evidence I‘m talking about, he‘ll
remind me of it. That‘s not something that a prosecutor typically
does.‖62 Bibb also made sure that ―reluctant witnesses (and some were
very reluctant) appeared and all the witnesses Lemus and Hidalgo called
to testify on the newly discovered evidence issue were prepared and

60
61
62

Bibb E-mail, supra note 29.
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5.
Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1.
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testified truthfully.‖63 Bibb not only prepped the defense witnesses, he
told them what he was going to ask them in his cross-examination. Bibb
comments:
Did that feel weird? Sure it did—but not that weird,
because I‘ve prepared witnesses to testify a thousand
times. I always tell witnesses what questions to expect
from the other side. This time, I told them what
questions to expect from the defense on direct, then I
said ―Here are the questions you‘re going to get on
cross.‖ A couple of the witnesses figured out what was
going on. They asked who was going to be crossing
them, and I told them that I was.64
Bibb did not try to undermine the eyewitnesses in his crossexamination. Both he and Cohen point out that he had a pragmatic
reason for preserving their credibility; namely, that they would also be
But
witnesses in his pending prosecution of Spanky Morales.65
according to Bibb, his basic motive was that he wanted to lose.
Cohen disputed that Bibb ―shot over the heads of the enemy‖:66
[T]he notion that the ADA ―threw the case‖ is not
accurate and belied by [Bibb‘s] conduct at the hearing
and the positions he took before the judge. Frankly,
there was no[t] a prosecutor in the DA‘s Office who
could have preserved those convictions. To suggest
otherwise does a disservice to the men and woman,
esp[ecially] Detective Addolorato, who worked so hard
to see justice done.67
Cohen nevertheless agrees that Bibb went through a genuine crisis of
conscience, and adds: ―I did come to like and respect Dan Bibb. He was
an honorable person caught in a terrible situation.‖ 68
How adversarial was Bibb? He and Cohen disagree. Steven Cohen
writes, ―While Dan may want to believe that he ‗threw the case‘, it sure
didn‘t look or feel that way in the courtroom.‖ 69 Bibb responds: ―I
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5. Bibb names Eddit Troche, Mike Colomer, and Darrell
Gray (a.k.a. Darrell Campbell) as reluctant witnesses. Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
64
Bibb Interview, supra note 46.
65
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5; Cohen E-mail, supra note 11.
66
Cohen Interview, supra note 28.
67
Cohen E-mail, supra note 11.
68
Id.
69
Id.
63
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would beg to differ. He has nothing to base his opinion on other than
the hearing. He has never seen me try a case other than the hearing.‖ 70
However, Bibb acknowledges that:
[T]here were also some standard adversarial positions I
had to take to satisfy my supervisors who were getting
daily copies of the transcript delivered to them all the
while knowing that the judge would rule in their favor.
Some of those positions were taken half-heartedly and I
knew the judge (who knows my courtroom take no
prisoners style well) would realize that.71
Why did Bibb handle the case the way he did? Here is his own
explanation, in a letter to bar disciplinary authorities:
I felt that I had a number of choices. The first was to
resign. While I am sure it would have garnered a lot of
press coverage, it would not have moved the matter
along to a just conclusion. In fact, it most likely would
have substantially delayed the matter, resulting in the
continued incarceration of two innocent men. The next
was insubordination, refusing to do the hearing and risk
being fired. Practically speaking, neither of these was an
option because I have a wife, three children, and a
mortgage and college tuition to pay and could not afford
to be out of work. The last was to do exactly what I
did.72
He adds: ―In this matter I did what every prosecutor should do, worked
to ensure a just result consistent with my conscience, ethical principles
and the evidence.‖73 Bibb recalls the events leading to his decision:
Up until the day I was ordered to do the hearing I was
confident that I would prevail in my efforts and that
there would never be a hearing. I truly believed that
common sense would prevail. . . . The day I was ordered
to do the hearing was the worst day of what was then a
22 ½ year career as a prosecutor. After I left work that
day I called a friend who is a civil engineer (and knows
70
71
72
73

Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
Bibb E-mail, 5:18, supra note 13.
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 4.
Id. at 5.
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about the criminal justice system only what he sees on
TV) and got together for a ‗few‘ drinks with him. . . . I
mulled over and discussed with my pal resigning in
protest, refusing to walk into the courtroom and letting
them fire me or throwing the hearing. . . . I decided then
that‘s what I would do. That was in the first week of
April 2005, a few weeks before the hearing began. 74
II. ETHICS AND PROSECUTORS
There is no doubt that what Dan Bibb did was unusual. And there is
no doubt that he violated the usual role expectations of the adversary
system, where lawyers never try to help the other side make their case
even when they think the other side is right. But did Bibb do anything
wrong?
Stephen Gillers, a nationally-renowned legal ethics expert, thought
he did and predicted that Bibb might face professional discipline. ―He‘s
entitled to his conscience,‖ Gillers wrote, ―but his conscience does not
entitle him to subvert his client‘s case . . . . It entitles him to withdraw
from the case, or quit if he can‘t.‖75 Bibb, on the other hand, said that he
didn‘t withdraw because ―he worried that if he did not take the case,
another prosecutor would—and possibly win.‖76
Now I have great admiration for Stephen Gillers (with whom I have
co-authored), but in this case I think he was wrong. Daniel Bibb
deserves a medal, not a reprimand.
Before I explain why, let‘s see what the ethics case against Bibb
might look like. Imagine that a private lawyer representing a private
client does the same thing. She locates truthful but adverse witnesses
and persuades them to testify. As a matter of fact, she reveals her crossexamination to them. Not only that, she goes beyond minimally
complying with her opponents‘ discovery requests—the civil
counterpart to minimally fulfilling a prosecutor‘s Brady obligations. She
points out connections between pieces of evidence to the opposing
lawyers. The lawyer does it because she thinks the other side was right,
and her client loses.
There is no question that the lawyer could and would be sued for
malpractice. As for ethics violations, the lawyer could be charged with
several: violating the requirement of competency;77 the requirement that
Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1.
76
Id.
77
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). Here and in the remainder of the
paragraph I cite to the Model Rules rather than New York‘s Code of Professional
74
75
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the client, not the lawyer, sets the goals of the representation;78 the
requirement of diligence (also known as ―zeal,‖ although the Model
Rules do not use that word in their text);79 and the conflict of interest
provision forbidding lawyers from taking cases where the lawyer‘s
representation of the client will be ―materially limited‖ by ―a personal
interest of the lawyer.‖80 Conceivably she could also be charged with
using client confidences against the client‘s interests, if any of her
conduct was based on confidential information from the client. 81 And, if
the lawyer kept her strategy secret from her law firm—which expected
her to zealously represent the client‘s position—she was engaging in
deceit, which the ethics rules prohibit. 82
In short, the lawyer in private practice would face a mountain of
ethics charges.
All the same prohibitions apply to a prosecutor, but there is one
crucial difference: prosecutors are not supposed to win at all costs. In a
time-honored formula, their job is to seek justice, not victory. This is a
mantra that appears in all the crucial ethics documents. It appears in a
comment to the current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: ―A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate.‖ 83 It appears in the Model Rules‘ predecessor, the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: ―The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict.‖84 The same language appears in the
ABA‘s Standards for the Prosecution Function. 85
The ancestor of all these pronouncements is the Supreme Court‘s
dictum in a 1935 case, Berger v. United States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
Responsibility, the operative rules in Bibb‘s jurisdiction. I do so for the sake of generality
and simplicity; the relevant New York rules do not differ from the Model Rules in any way
that matters for the points I am raising.
78
Id. R. 1.2(a).
79
Id. R. 1.3.
80
Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
81
Id. R. 1.8(b).
82
Id. R. 8.4(c).
83
Id. R. 3.8 cmt.
84
MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf.
85
AM. BAR ASS‘N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (―The duty of the prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict.‖).
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as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.86
This is a very different way to think about a lawyer‘s role in the
adversary system than we are used to in other contexts. It is especially
different from the criminal defense attorney‘s role, which most lawyers
and scholars agree requires maximum zeal on the client‘s behalf.87 Now
in one way, this stark difference between the prosecutor‘s mission and
the mission assigned to other advocates in the adversary system is
obvious: the criminal justice system would be a travesty if a prosecutor,
holding years of someone‘s life in her hands, cared about nothing but
notching another victory.
But I do want to point out that the Berger dictum, with its ―seek
justice not victory‖ formula, runs entirely against the grain of popular
anti-crime sentiment as well as the way people commonly think about
the adversary system. In popular sentiment, criminals are by definition
bad guys, prosecutors who lock them up are, for that reason, good guys,
and defense lawyers live under a perpetual cloud of suspicion, reflected
in endless griping about clever lawyers who get crooks off on
technicalities. Criminal defenders constantly face the question ―[h]ow
can you represent people like that?‖—or the more sophisticated law
student‘s version, ―I understand why the system needs defense lawyers,
but personally I could never do that kind of work.‖ As for our
conventional understanding of the adversary system, it envisions
complete symmetry of obligation between the two sides: they are both
supposed to fight as hard as they can to win.
The ―seek justice not victory‖ formula, coupled with the view that
criminal defense requires the maximum level of zealous advocacy,
presents an entirely upside down model. Now, we have asymmetrical
obligations: the defender is supposed to seek victory, not justice, while
86
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612–13 (1999). Although Berger is the
locus classicus of the ―seek justice not victory‖ principle, it dates back at least to the
nineteenth century. Id.
87
William H. Simon is a prominent exception who does not distinguish the criminal
defender‘s obligations from those of other lawyers and whose overall view is that all
lawyers should be guided, like prosecutors, by the ethical principle of seeking justice not
victory. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS
(2000).
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the prosecutor is constrained to seek justice, not victory. Prosecutors, it
seems, are simply not supposed to fight to win the way defenders are.
Admittedly, there is a delphic quality to the ―seek justice not
victory‖ formula. Justice is a grandiose and vague word. Oliver
Wendell Holmes famously said ―I hate justice, which means that I know
if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking
thinking in legal terms.‖88 The formal ethics rules—as opposed to
aspirational standards like the ABA‘s Standards for the Prosecution
Function—take a pretty minimalist view of the prosecutor‘s obligations.
Prosecutors should not proceed without probable cause, they should
make a reasonable effort to ensure that the accused has been informed of
his rights, they should not try to get an unrepresented person to waive
rights, and they should do timely Brady disclosures.89 They should not
subpoena defense lawyers unless they have to.90 And they should
refrain from inflammatory public comments about their cases—a rule all
too often honored in the breach.91 In most jurisdictions, that is the extent
of their ethical obligations. These rules leave loads of leeway for
prosecutors to seek victory regardless of justice, without facing even a
whiff of professional discipline. As Bibb notes, ―I could have done a lot
of things both inside and outside the courtroom that would have been
perfectly legal and ethical to frustrate their [the defense lawyers‘] efforts.
The fact is that I didn‘t do them . . . .‖92
Fred Zacharias, in a leading scholarly article on the ―seek justice not
victory‖ formula, thinks that the justice prosecutors seek ―has two fairly
limited prongs: (1) prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a
good faith belief that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must
ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial.‖ 93
The formal ethics rules do not go even that far.
And yet I have spoken with a lot of prosecutors who take ―seek
justice not victory‖ seriously, even if they are not 100% confident they
know exactly what it requires. At the very least, as Zacharias‘s first
point indicates, they know you should not try to keep people behind
bars if you think they didn‘t do it.
In 2008, the ABA House of Delegates agreed. The ABA added two
Model Rules to deal with prosecutors‘ obligations when new evidence
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (July 1, 1929), in JUSTICE HOLMES
AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921–32, at 53 (1947).
89
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)–(d) (2008).
90
Id. R. 3.8(e).
91
Id. R. 3.8(f).
92
Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
93
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 49 (1991).
88
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suggests that they obtained wrongful convictions. One requires a
prosecutor who learns of ―new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an
offense of which the defendant was convicted,‖ to disclose the evidence
to the proper authorities as well as the defendant and to initiate an
investigation.94 If the evidence is clear and convincing, the prosecutor
must ―seek to remedy the conviction.‖95 Two prominent scholars have
argued that these rules do not go far enough because evidence that a
convicted person is probably innocent should impel a conscientious
prosecutor to try to remedy the injustice, even if the evidence is not clear
and convincing.96
These rules are rather new, and to date only three states have
adopted them.97 Furthermore, it seems perfectly clear that the ABA was
not thinking of Bibb‘s unorthodox tactics as the way a lawyer should
―seek to remedy the conviction.‖98 But what, after all, did Bibb do
wrong? He persuaded reluctant witnesses to show up in court and
testify against the state. Think for a moment about the alternative. Bibb
was assigned to investigate the Palladium case, and he went on an
odyssey to track down the witnesses: sixty interviews, fifteen states,
eleven prisons, one county jail.99 Once he had the evidence, he was
under an obligation to turn it over to the defense if it was exculpatory—
which he did.
The alternatives: don‘t investigate the case very well for fear you
will find out that the men doing 25-years-to-life are innocent; or, having
investigated it, don‘t turn over the exculpatory evidence to the defense,
violating your constitutional and ethical obligations; or, having turned it
over, put the defense to the difficulty of locating the witnesses and
getting them to court—so, if the defenders do not succeed, the truth stays
buried. That is the ethical obligation of a public prosecutor?
I hope your answer to my rhetorical question is no, but it may not be.
A great many lawyers think that putting the other side to the effort and
expense of getting witnesses to court is exactly what the adversary
system contemplates. Sometimes, people quote a line from the Supreme
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g).
Id. R. 3.8(h).
96
Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 508 (2009).
97
E.g., DEL. LAW. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d)(2) (2010); WIS. RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS, SCR 20: 3.8(g)–(h)(2010) ; see also COLO. R. CIV. P. app. ch. 18–20
(omitting the duty to initiate an investigation and thus establishing a slightly weaker duty
than in ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h)).
98
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h).
99
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 2.
94
95
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Court‘s decision in Hickman v. Taylor, that ―a learned profession‖ is not
supposed ―to perform its functions . . . on wits borrowed from the
adversary.‖100
I think the Palladium case is a good illustration of how absurd this
dictum is. Bibb persuaded reluctant witnesses—not all of whom were
solid citizens—to testify truthfully.101 Would not doing so have impeded
the search for truth? As I noted above, Steve Cohen believes that the
favorable result in the 440 hearing was ―pre-ordained,‖102 but Bibb
responds, ―I am sure you know that nothing is pre-ordained in the
criminal justice system.‖103 It really doesn‘t matter who is right. Bibb
feared a grotesque injustice—otherwise he had no motive to hold his fire
any way—and for a lawyer facing such a situation, thinking the result is
pre-ordained is a luxury you cannot afford, whether or not it is true.
Getting key witnesses onto the stand is exactly what was required to
seek justice not victory in this case.
One hundred and eighty years ago, John Stuart Mill criticized jurists
who looked at the adversary system through ―fox-hunting eyes,‖ as if it
were nothing more than ―a sort of game, partly of chance, partly of
skill.‖104 That fox hunter‘s outlook seems to be the Supreme Court‘s in
Hickman v. Taylor, and it is also the outlook of anyone who thinks the
prosecutor‘s job is to stand pat and let the defense get the witnesses to
testify—if they can. Years ago, when I first began studying the
adversary system, I thought that if this is what lawyering in an
adversary system means, it is a large strike against the adversary system.
I still think so. But even if you are a bigger fan than I am of the
adversary system, you should agree that standing pat in this case would
have violated the prosecutor‘s special responsibility to seek justice not
victory.
Admittedly, it is odd to have the prosecutor discuss with the defense
how the evidence fits together, and odder still to tell witnesses what he
plans to ask them on cross-examination. Notice something important,
though: in this case, Bibb‘s tactics advanced the search for truth and the

329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Court was referring specifically
to discovery rules, but it set its discussion in the more general context that ―a common law
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.‖ Id.
101
Bibb Interview, supra note 46. Cohen doubts that Bibb had a better relationship with
the witnesses than he did, after his many years working on the case. Cohen Interview,
supra note 28. Bibb, however, disagrees. Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
102
Cohen E-mail, supra note 11.
103
Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
104
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH
PRACTICE 317–18 (Mill annot.) (1827).
100
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protection of rights. These are precisely the two values that defenders of
the adversary system argue it is there to promote. 105
In truth, Bibb‘s conduct may not be so extraordinary. A former
federal prosecutor tells me that it is not unusual for prosecutors to throw
cases at the grand jury stage because they think the case stinks, but they
are under pressure to take it to the grand jury. That is less conspicuous
than Bibb throwing the case at a public hearing, but morally it is hard to
see the difference.
An important point is lurking in the background here. One reason
some lawyers feel uncomfortable with the adage ―seek justice not
victory‖ is that there is no consensus about what justice is, and we have
every reason to doubt there ever will be. Philosophers who spend their
lives thinking about the theory of justice don‘t agree about whose theory
is right. But you do not need a philosophical theory of justice to
recognize gross injustice when you see it. Our sense of injustice is more
basic, less controversial, and less dependent on philosophical arguments
than propositions about justice. 106 ―Avoid injustice‖ might be a more
useful imperative than ―seek justice,‖ even if it is less catchy and less
inspirational. It is probably what prosecutors actually do when they take
―seek justice not victory‖ seriously.
III. WHY SHOULD PROSECUTORS SEEK JUSTICE, NOT VICTORY?
Scholars have advanced two theories for why the prosecutor‘s job is
to seek justice not victory.107 One points to the power differential
between the state and the accused individual. The state has tremendous
resources: police to investigate cases, crime labs to examine evidence,
Of course, the reader may wonder whether greater cooperation among lawyers would
enhance the search for truth and the protection of rights across a wide range of cases. That
is an excellent question, and it is part of the reason that I have doubts about the adversary
system. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19–64 (2009) [hereinafter
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS]; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67–92
(1988).
106
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990); see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE iix, 21 (2009) (asserting that ―prevention of manifest injustice‖ is more important
than seeking perfect justice). Roberto Unger once wrote about the ―basic, common
experience in modern society . . . of being surrounded by injustice without knowing where
justice lies‖—an acknowledgment that our sense of injustice is keener than our
understanding of justice. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY:
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 175 (1976); see also STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE
AND EXPERIENCE 106 (1989) (arguing that even though people cannot agree on a theory of
the good, everyone can recognize the great evils). Hampshire writes, ―every population of
intelligent persons should be a patchwork of minorities in the pursuit of deviant
conceptions of the good, held together by a shared respect for fairness.‖ Id. at 132.
107
Green, supra note 86, at 625–37.
105
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and—of course—the charging power to flip witnesses and induce plea
bargains. The accused typically has an overworked defender with little
or no capacity to investigate; in many cases, the accused is in jail. Even
the names attached to criminal cases show the power imbalance: State v.
Defendant, People v. Defendant, United States v. Defendant. Because of the
power imbalance, it is essential that prosecutors not take victory as their
sole goal. Call this the power theory.
The other theory focuses not on the power imbalance between the
government and the accused, but on the special duty of the executive to
govern justly and impartially. That is the theory in the Berger case,
which I quoted earlier: the prosecutor ―is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.‖ 108
Call this the sovereignty theory.
In my view, neither theory tells the whole story. The sovereignty
theory does not explain why prosecutors, seeking victory in an
adversary contest where the defense is doing the same, are not
governing impartially. Why isn‘t procedural justice within in the
adversary system all the justice prosecutors need to seek? Surely part of
the explanation is the power imbalance: giving the state most of the
cards in a purely competitive contest, where the only goal is victory,
means that it will win even when the defense would prevail in a more
even context. So the sovereignty theory needs the power theory to back
it up—otherwise, it does not adequately explain why prosecutors should
seek justice not victory.
Conversely, the power theory does not explain what is wrong with a
pro-government power imbalance, which, after all, many people think is
the best way to fight crime. The answer must be that we want more
from government than fighting crime: we want government to bend
over backwards to achieve fairness and avoid collateral damage to the
innocent in the war against crime. In other words, the power theory
needs the sovereignty theory to back it up.
In short, each theory needs the other. But even combining them
leaves out something essential: the stakes are so much higher in criminal
law than anywhere else. We have one of the world‘s harshest criminal
justice systems, with lengthy sentences, draconian conditions of
confinement, little if any interest in rehabilitation, loss of rights to
convicted felons even after they serve their time, and stigma that follows
convicts forever, blighting their chances to make a fresh start. As
everyone knows or should know, the United States currently has more

108

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 1

22

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

people locked up than any nation in history, both per capita and in
absolute numbers.
But the United States also has a constitution built on principles of
limited government and individual rights. It is an interesting puzzle
how the same country that traditionally fears government abuse and
rallies around the libertarian slogan ―don‘t tread on me!‖ can at the same
time be so addicted to harsh punishment—but this is not the occasion to
address the puzzle.109
Instead, I want to emphasize that the protection of individual rights
from government abuse is a key part of our political tradition, and the
harshness of our punishments makes the protection of rights in the
criminal process a matter of life and death. That is why the power
imbalance in the criminal justice system and the government‘s
commitment to impartiality are so important. ―Seek justice not victory‖
weaves together all three concerns. Prosecutors should not exploit the
power imbalance, and they should care immensely about the rights of
the accused, including the substantive right to stay out of jail when you
are innocent, because of the enormously high stakes in these cases.
Every good prosecutor understands that she holds years of a person‘s
life in her hands.
Obviously, prosecutors are not responsible for mass incarceration—
they deal with criminal cases retail, not wholesale, and legislatures‘
addiction to ratcheting up punishments is not the prosecutor‘s fault. But
the prosecutor is the gatekeeper of the system, the one who decides
which cases go from the paddy wagon to the courtroom. The
prosecutor‘s conscience is the invisible guardian of our rights, just as the
defense lawyer is the visible guardian. What made Bibb‘s conduct in the
Palladium case so remarkable is that here, the invisible guardian became
visible.
IV. IS HIERARCHY PROCESS?—OR, WHO DECIDES WHAT JUSTICE IS?
I hope I have adequately explained why prosecutors must seek
justice, not merely victory. But to this point, I have left out one crucial
piece of the story: Bibb was working in a law office, and his superiors in
the chain of command disagreed with him. Granted that prosecutors
must seek justice, who decides what justice is? Isn‘t that a decision for
the boss rather than an Assistant D.A.?

109
For an ambitious attempt at an explanation, see generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND
EUROPE (2003) (tracing the difference between U.S. and European penal practices to a
different cultural approaches to egalitarianism).
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When I blogged about Bibb and the Palladium case in 2008, several
ethics experts objected that I was wrong to ignore the hierarchy of the
D.A.‘s office. John Steele, a founder of the blog Legal Ethics Forum, put it
this way:
Suppose . . . a subordinate lawyer thinks that the
evidence doesn‘t meet the high threshold a prosecutor
should have before trying a defendant—but the
supervisory lawyer disagrees. . . .
Should the subordinate lawyer accede to the
supervisor‘s orders and try the case, ask to be moved to
another case, resign from the organization, or secretly
subvert the supervisor‘s orders while pretending to
follow them?
The only answer I can‘t support is the last one. It‘s
deceit on the supervisor, deceit on the organization, and
deceit on the court.110
Law professor Marty Lederman, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel, agrees:
The prosecutor here was the elected Manhattan
D.A., who chose to go ahead with the prosecution. . . .
. . . [L]et‘s assume, as we must here, that the D.A. was
not persuaded by Bibb, and concluded that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
At that point, Bibb is acting as an agent of the D.A. If
he firmly believes his supervisor was wrong, Steele is
correct that he can—perhaps should—ask to be removed
from the case, or resign. If he thinks the D.A. is willfully
acting unlawfully, perhaps he should even make a stink
about [it] to the relevant authorities or in public.
But act as an unfaithful agent? . . .
This may not be an ethics violation—but it‘s a
violation of one‘s contract with the principal, a violation

John Steele, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION (June
24, 2008, 6:37 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-good-prosecutor-throwscase.html.
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of agency principles, and, as you concede, a fraud on the
D.A.111
And Stephen Gillers wrote this:
Morgenthau speaks for the client, the People. He was
elected not Bibb. It is analogous to a CEO or Board
speaking for the company. . . .
....
. . . Would David support a Bibb-like act in the next case
if another assistant threw the case honestly convinced
that it is what justice required, ignoring contrary
instruction, and it turned out that the freed person really
was factually guilty? We law professors have the luxury
of living in a more or less hierarchy-free world, but in
the ‗real life‘ of big law offices, including government
ones, hierarchy is process.112
It would take another lecture as long as this one to fully respond to
these comments, but my basic answer is very simple. I agree that if you
work in an organization—at any rate a decent organization—you should
generally respect the chain of command. And if your supervisors reach a
different conclusion than you about the same evidence, you should
earnestly consider whether their judgment might be better or more
objective than yours.
But sometimes it may happen that your certainty remains
unshakeable, even when you have tried as hard as you can to see it their
way. And sometimes the magnitude of the injustice is intolerable.
Lastly, once in a great while, nobody can stop the injustice but you. At
that point, the demands of conscience, and indeed of human decency,
prevail over the office hierarchy.
In the Palladium case, no prosecutor knew the facts and evidence as
well as Bibb. He had met the witnesses, he had spent hours sizing them
up, he had lived with the case for two years. Of course as an abstract
matter, he might have read the evidence wrong and his supervisors
might have been right. But in the real world, this abstract possibility was
negligible. His supervisors had little or nothing to go on except the
111
Marty Lederman, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION,
(June 25, 2008, 7:36 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-good-prosecutorthrows-case.html.
112
Stephen Gillers, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION,
(June 25, 2008, 8:34 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-good-prosecutorthrows-case.html.
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information that Bibb gave them plus the facts that the defense lawyers
and Detective Addolorato had compiled over the years.
Bibb rejects the accusation that he was an unfaithful agent, because
―given [their] many discussions about the matter‖ his superiors
―certainly knew the result [he] wanted and intended to seek.‖113 Why
his supervisors did not follow Bibb‘s recommendation remains the great
mystery of the Palladium case. Maybe it was bureaucratic inertia.
Maybe it was reluctance to confess error. Maybe no one wanted to be
the one to step up and pull the plug on the case. Cohen suspects that
decision makers in the office regarded defense efforts as a personal
attack on the D.A.‘s office and the legendary district attorney Robert
Morgenthau.114 What seems inconceivable is that anyone in the D.A.‘s
office looked at Bibb‘s evidence as hard as he did and concluded beyond
a reasonable doubt that Lemus and Hidalgo were the killers.
As for the size of the injustice: if Bibb was right, two innocent men
had spent fourteen years in prison for a crime they had not committed,
and were looking at many more years. Injustice doesn‘t get much
grosser than that.
Next, consider the magnitude of whatever wrong Bibb did by
throwing the case. It isn‘t large. As I hope I have made clear, throwing
the case meant that Bibb did what he could to make sure that the
reluctant witnesses testified and the truth came out. And he refrained
from discrediting the truthful witnesses in cross-examination. The
wrong, in other words, consisted almost entirely of improving the search
for truth. The deceit on the supervisor, if it existed, lay in letting the
supervisor believe that Bibb was going to let truthful testimony stay
buried. This strikes me as a trivial sin, if it is a sin at all. The deceit on
the court was nonexistent.
Finally, Bibb feared that no other prosecutor could have or would
have gotten all the witnesses to testify. If he withdrew, Lemus and
Hidalgo might still be in prison. Most lawyers I have spoken with about
this case instinctively think that if you cannot in good conscience go
forward with a case, the only ethical thing to do is withdraw. With due
respect, I think this dodges the full force of the dilemma: what if
withdrawing would perpetuate the injustice? There is a familiar law
school joke about what students should do if they have to guess at an
answer on the MPRE: when in doubt, always pick the second most
ethical of the four choices. In the Palladium case, that would have been
withdrawing.

113
114

Bibb E-mail, supra note 29.
Cohen Interview, supra note 28.
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Of course, if Steve Cohen is correct, no prosecutor could have
defended the Lemus and Hidalgo convictions, and Bibb could have
safely withdrawn. Bibb did not see it that way; ―he worried that if he
did not take the case, another prosecutor would—and possibly win.‖115
Moreover, Bibb‘s previously quoted letter points out that withdrawing
would have caused further delays and left Lemus and Hidalgo in prison
longer.116 Finally, withdrawing from a case receiving intense media
scrutiny would have been tantamount to revealing the sharp split
between Bibb and his superiors, and he may have concluded that that
would do more damage to his office than the course he actually
pursued.117
Alternatively, Bibb might have presented the case with full
adversarial vigor, but then told the judge his own personal view that the
men were innocent.118 But in this case, proceeding with full adversarial
vigor would mean not persuading the witnesses to testify or, if they did
testify, going after them in cross-examination to discredit what they said.
Either way, the result might have been a grave injustice.119 In any event,
it strikes me as odder than what Bibb did for a lawyer to discredit new
exculpatory evidence as strongly as possible, present a closing statement
arguing that the evidence supports the convictions (as full adversarial
vigor requires), but then assert a personal belief—based, presumably, on
the same evidence—that the men are innocent.
The basic problem with viewing hierarchy as process is that
organizations, including good organizations, can malfunction badly.
The record of the Palladium case, reviewed in the published judicial
opinions as well as numerous news stories, shows astonishing resistance
to the truth in the police and the D.A.‘s office stretching over many
years. Detective Garcia had information that Morales and Pillot were the
shooters virtually from the beginning of the investigation but did not
properly memorialize it. The D.A.‘s office repeatedly rebuffed Detective
Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1.
Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 4.
117
Bibb also makes clear that with bills to pay he did not want to leave his job, which
would have been the inevitable outcome of a withdrawal that embarrassed the D.A.‘s
office. Id. This, of course, is not a justification for choosing the course of action he did, but
it is a perfectly understandable excuse.
118
See Melanie D. Wilson, Finding a Happy and Ethical Medium Between a Prosecutor Who
Believes the Defendant Didn’t Do It and the Boss Who Says That He Did, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 65,
69–70 (2008) (proposing that prosecutors present the opinions of their office to the court but
then offer their own independent perspective).
119
In the Palladium case, the judge at one point did ask Bibb what he thought, and he
replied, ―[t]he position of the District Attorney is . . . .‖ Bibb Interview, supra note 46. Then
the judge responded ―[b]ut what do you think?‖ Id. Bibb again answered, ―[t]he position
of the D.A.‘s office is . . . .‖ Id. Presumably, his message got across.
115
116
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Addolorato and, later, Cohen. At the first 440 hearing, the office pressed
the third-shooter theory, despite the lack of evidence of any connection
between Lemus, Hidalgo, and Morales. Steve Cohen points to ―years of
Detective Addolorato (who was still then with the NYPD), the defense
team and Dan Slepian (from Dateline NBC) amassing evidence
demonstrating that the wrong men were in jail, of producing that
evidence to the Manhattan DAs office, of watching as the evidence was
ignored, [and] of being subjected to unwarranted and inexcusable
delay.‖120 Cohen believes that even the assignment of Dan Bibb to
reinvestigate the case as thoroughly as he did was a delaying tactic by
the D.A.‘s office.
What explains the evident dysfunction in a generally impressive
office? Cohen provides background about why the D.A.‘s office was
originally resistant to his information about Joey Pillot‘s confession:
there was a long-standing rivalry between the D.A.‘s office and the
Eastern and Southern Districts‘ U.S. Attorney‘s offices (and, he adds, the
FBI). ―The complexity was that we [the U.S. Attorney‘s office] were
bringing gang cases [when Cohen was involved in the federal
investigation of C&C]. Manhattan thought we were treading on their
turf; they had the expertise—and in part they were right about that. We
had resolved this friction in the Bronx, but not in Manhattan.‖ 121 Then,
over the years, as the injustice to Lemus and Hidalgo became greater, it
became harder rather than easier for the office to admit error or
incompetence—a familiar psychological dynamic in which people
become invested in their own earlier decisions.122
Cohen writes, ―During my years dealing with the Palladium case, I
was continually reminded of the work of Stanley Milgram and Philip
Zimbardo, the social scientists who conducted obedience experiments.
Unfortunately, (I fear) what might be learned from this tragedy is missed
time and again.‖123 The experiments he refers to are classics of social
psychology, studying the dynamics by which structures of authority and
role undermine moral judgment.124 In Milgram‘s obedience experiments,
Cohen E-mail, supra note 11. The author corrected minor typos in this quote from the
e-mail, which Cohen wrote on a Blackberry.
121
Cohen Interview, supra note 28.
122
See Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-inthe-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1966) (describing one version of
this phenomenon, called the ―foot-in-the-door‖ effect of which Freedman and Fraser‘s is
the classic experiment).
123
Cohen E-mail, supra note 11.
124
For discussions of psychological obedience studies, see generally STANLEY MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (Perennial 2004) (1974); ARTHUR G.
MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF CONTROVERSY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1986); Philip G. Zimbardo, A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at
120
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subjects ordered to administer escalating, possibly lethal electrical shocks
to other subjects (who were actually confederates of the experimenter—
and the shocks were fake) found it very hard to break off. Indeed, twothirds of them went all the way to the highest voltage. Milgram‘s
explanation was that ―if he breaks off, he must say to himself:
‗Everything I have done to this point is bad, and I now acknowledge it
by breaking off.‘ But if he goes on, he is reassured about his past
performance.‖125 This may well have been the psychology in the D.A.‘s
office. Even if hierarchy is process, it can be a terribly flawed process:
good when it works, but incapable of self-correction when it does not.
V. THE SOCRATIC IDEAL
I now turn to my final question, perhaps the hardest question in
legal ethics. What role does conscience play in lawyer‘s ethics, when
conscience presses one way but the professional rules press the other?
In the Western philosophical tradition, the first and greatest
discussion of conscience is the Apology of Socrates, as related by Plato. 126
Standing accused before an Athenian court, Socrates told the jurors
about his daimon, ―a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it
always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges
me forward.‖127 Socrates explained that his daimon ―always spoke to me
very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was
going to do anything I should not . . . .‖128 What Socrates was describing
is the voice of conscience.
The basic principle of Socratic ethics is that it is worse to do wrong
than to suffer wrong.129 In the Apology, Socrates reminds his jurors of
two episodes that nearly cost him his life. Once, when he held a public
office, the Athenians wanted to put some generals on trial illegally, and
Socrates was the only one to oppose them. ―I thought I must run the risk
to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you
Stanford University, STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org/ (last
visited July 28, 2010) (discussing the Stanford Prison Experiment). Zimbardo‘s more recent
book discusses the Stanford Prison Experiment as well as other relevant studies in social
psychology. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2008). For my analysis of these and other experiments relevant to
organizational pathologies, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 105, at 239–97.
125
MILGRAM, supra note 124, at 149.
126
The Apology, in PLATO, EUTHYPHRO ∙ APOLOGY ∙ CRITO ∙ PHAEDO ∙ PHAEDRUS 61–146
(G.P. Goold ed., Harold North Fowler trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1990) (1914).
127
Id. at 115.
128
Id. at 139.
129
Gorgias, in PLATO, LYSIS SYMPOSIUM GORGIAS, 247–533 (G.P. Goold ed., W.R.M Lamb
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1983) (1925).
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when your wishes were unjust . . . .‖130 On another occasion, the
dictators of Athens ordered Socrates and some others to arrest a man
named Leon and bring him to be illegally executed. As Socrates reminds
the jury, ―when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to
Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home . . . .‖131
Both times, Socrates defied public authority to avoid participating in
wrongful criminal punishments. The examples no doubt infuriated his
jurors, because of course Socrates was arguing that his own conviction
would be unjust, and the examples were an ironic rebuke to those who
were about to convict him.132 Ironic or not, the examples show us
something crucial: the paradigm case of conscience lies in refusing to
acquiesce in the wrongful conviction of the innocent.
Of course I am not comparing Dan Bibb to Socrates. Bibb is an
unpretentious, plainspoken lawyer, and he would undoubtedly find the
comparison embarrassing and absurd. Hopefully any of us would. My
point is the striking fact that when Socrates illustrates his conscience at
work, he picks examples where public authorities wanted him to
participate in wrongful convictions. You might say that these are the
original conscience cases.
Bibb was not a chronic malcontent. He was a career prosecutor who
liked his job and believed in its value. Bibb let me know that he is a
conservative with a strong law and order bent. Cohen describes Bibb as
the kind of prosecutor who did not habitually resolve borderline
judgments in a defendant‘s favor. Bibb may well have gone into the
Palladium investigation inclined to defend the convictions if the
evidence of innocence was less than clear. That would explain why his
investigation was so long and thorough—from Cohen‘s standpoint,
longer than it needed to be, given the amount of evidence the defense
had already amassed showing that Morales and Pillot were the true
culprits and had nothing to do with Lemus and Hidalgo. 133 As a veteran
of the office who had worked with Stephen Saracco in the Cold Cases
Unit, Bibb knew about the Palladium case, and he was obviously familiar
Apology, supra note 126, at 117.
Id.
132
Id. at 129. After the jury convicted him, Socrates further infuriated the jurors by
proposing that his punishment should consist of free meals for life in the city hall. Id. They
sentenced him to death. Socrates concluded that death must not be so bad, because his
conscience had not spoken to him to tell him he should not have defended himself the way
he did. Id. at 139–41.
133
See Cohen Interview, supra note 28 (―From my perspective, two-thirds of the
interviews were unnecessary, on issues that weren‘t germane.‖). Bibb responds that the
only way he could know that was to do the interviews. Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13.
Bibb acknowledges that he had completed the most important interviews in 2003, and had
already concluded that Lemus and Hidalgo deserved a new trial. Id.
130
131
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with the office‘s many years of stubbornness. It must have been much
harder for Bibb to accept that he was being ordered to defend the
indefensible than a non-prosecutor outsider, faced with the same
evidence, might find plausible. What matters is that, in the end, Bibb
was bigger than the role his office assigned him.
Cohen remarks, ―No doubt, the experience of representing the
[D.A.‘s office] was emotional torture for ADA Bibb (as well as
humiliating), and I am certain that ADA Bibb had a crisis of conscience
at some point shortly before the hearing.‖134 As mentioned earlier, Bibb
decided to throw the case in April 2005, a few weeks before the hearing,
but, as he relates it, his conclusions about the case developed much
earlier:
As far as my ―crisis of conscience‖ goes, I came to
believe that the convictions should be set aside and the
indictments dismissed (but not necessarily in their
innocence) by the end of 2003. Most of the important
witnesses had been interviewed by then, especially
Troche and Gray. . . . In July 2003 . . . . I told [Cohen]
what Troche said and offered my opinion that Spanky‘s
admissions to Troche placed him in the role Lemus
played and, therefore, called into question the
identifications of Lemus. . . .
. . . . I argued as much in the many meetings with my
supervisors beginning in 2004.
I really began to
forcefully argue my beliefs in a meeting with my direct
supervisor in April 2004.135
Cohen remarked to me that Bibb‘s demeanor at the hearing showed
signs of strain that reminded him of Stanley Milgram‘s experimental
subjects, who visibly struggled with the dilemma of whether to obey
orders that are obviously harmful to an innocent person. Bibb agrees
that he was under considerable strain:
And as far as stress goes, I can‘t even begin to describe
it. I‘d been in courtrooms sitting across from guys who
were multiple murderers, trying to get a jury to convict
him [sic] of all those homicides and didn‘t feel any stress
whatsoever. This was just different. When I think back
on it I sometimes wonder (as does my wife) how I
134
135
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survived the whole mess. If I had it to do over again I
think I would just quit the office or refuse to do the
hearing. Being out of work would have been a hell of a
lot less stressful.136
At one point, Bibb remarked to me, ―I‘ve become a case. It‘s the
worst thing in the world—being known for just one thing. Forget all the
good I did, all the prosecutions over the years, all the bad guys I put
behind bars.‖137 I did not quite know what to say, because of course the
Palladium case was the reason I was talking with him. But I got his
point, and it is an important one. Conscience is not the special property
of moralists and saints. It is not the property of humanitarians with
refined sensibilities—prosecuting felonies is not the career choice of
delicate people. If you are lucky, you may never encounter a conscience
case, although I suspect that prosecutors encounter them more often
than they recognize. The test of character is whether, when you do, you
can be stubborn enough and creative enough to rise to the occasion.

Bibb E-mail, 5:18, supra note 13.
Bibb Interview, supra note 46; see also Bibb E-mail, supra note 29 (describing recent
experiences where strangers identify him because of his connection to the case).
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